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CHEVRON’S REGRETS:
THE PERSISTENT VITALITY OF THE
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
MICHAEL C. POLLACK*
Since the Chevron decision in 1984, courts have extended to administrative agencies a high level of deference when those agencies reasonably interpret ambiguous
statutes, reasoning that agencies have more technical expertise and public accountability than courts. However, when the agency’s interpretation implicates a significant policy choice, courts do not always defer. At times, they rely on principles of
nondelegation to rule against the agency interpretation and require that choices be
made by Congress instead.
Chevron makes no explicit exception for significant policy choices, but in cases like
MCI v. AT&T and FDA v. Brown & Williamson, the Supreme Court has manipulated the application of the Chevron test to find statutory clarity and preclude deference to agencies for exactly this reason. Led by litigants who highlighted the
separation of powers implications of the agency’s interpretations, the Court has
suggested both that the principles of nondelegation remain a constitutional constraint and that alluding to them, even without resort to some canon of interpretation, is a viable litigation strategy.
This Note exposes and defends the persistent, if unspoken, role played by the principles of nondelegation in the jurisprudence of the administrative state in an era of
Chevron deference. It draws a strategic and doctrinal framework from which to
challenge agencies’ statutory interpretations and presents a live circuit split
involving the authority of the Food and Drug Administration to criminalize certain
failures to maintain research records that is a ripe opportunity for applying that
framework.

INTRODUCTION
The American people, and even some judges and senators, seem
to have truly lost faith in Congress’s ability to legislate effectively.1 At
* Copyright  2011 by Michael C. Pollack. J.D. Candidate, 2011, New York University
School of Law; B.A., 2008, Swarthmore College. I am grateful to the Honorable Robert A.
Katzmann, the Honorable Harry T. Edwards, and Professors Lily Batchelder, Barry
Friedman, Michael Livermore, Burt Neuborne, Richard Revesz, and Kenji Yoshino for
their advice, guidance, suggestions, and critiques. I would also like to thank Dina Hardy,
Angela Herring, Megan Lew, Shannon McGovern, the editorial staff of the New York
University Law Review, and my colleagues in the Furman Academic Scholars Program for
their encouragement and valuable comments. All remaining errors are mine alone. Finally,
I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Alan Pollack and to Corlett Wolfe Wood. Without
their love, support, input, and indulgence, none of this would have been possible.
1 See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary
Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 251, 270 (2010) (describing Congress as “government of
buck-passing”); Evan Bayh, Op-Ed., Why I’m Leaving the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
2010, at WK9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/21/opinion/21bayh.html?hp
(“[T]he institutional inertia gripping Congress is no laughing matter.”). A February 2010
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the same time, because they are removed from immediate democratic
accountability, there is a pervasive distrust of the vast array of regulatory agencies that could fill some of the legislative void.2 Even while
recognizing Congress’s limitations, we may fairly criticize Congress for
passing off politically sensitive or complicated policy questions to
these administrative actors. It is almost as if we must choose between
the ineffectiveness of a legitimate, legislative source of law and the
potential illegitimacy of an effective, but unelected, bureaucracy.
The courts, too, tangle with the degree to which the Constitution
permits Congress to transfer its responsibilities to administrative
agencies and the degree to which agencies may take on such authority.
On one hand, the longstanding nondelegation doctrine requires congressional primacy in the making of policy judgments. However,
beginning in the 1980s with the seminal Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council decision, courts have deferred to
agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguity in their statutory
authority.3 Because the Chevron doctrine permits agencies to make
fairly significant judgments in the course of these gap-filling interpretations, its adoption is often seen as having confirmed, or even precipitated, the end of the nondelegation doctrine.4 This understanding of
Chevron’s role, the current status of the nondelegation doctrine, and,
most of all, the interaction between them, is incorrect. While Chevron
may be described as a revolutionary decision,5 subsequent applications have made clear that courts are uncomfortable with the extent of
deference that Chevron could logically require. Not only have courts
poll found that eighty-six percent of respondents said that the U.S. system of government
“is broken.” CNN Poll: Majority Think Government is Broken, CNN POLITICS (Feb. 21,
2010, 8:45 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/02/21/cnn-poll-majority-thinkgovernment-is-broken/.
2 See, e.g., Joseph P. Tomain & Sidney A. Shapiro, Analyzing Government Regulation,
49 ADMIN. L. REV. 377, 378 (1997) (“In addition to its ubiquity, government regulation . . .
is notably unpopular.”); Press Release, John Boehner, House Republican Leader,
Republican Chart Outlines House Democrats’ Government Takeover of Health Care (July
15, 2009), available at http://speaker.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=1373
04 (“Families shouldn’t have to answer to shadowy Washington bureaucrats . . . .”).
3 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
4 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 834 (1991) (describing Chevron as having
“drive[n] the last nail in the sporadically reopened casket of the nondelegation doctrine”).
For further discussion of nondelegation, see Part I.B, infra. For discussion of Chevron, see
Part I.A, infra.
5 Indeed, “Chevron is one of the most important decisions in the history of administrative law. It has been cited and applied in more cases than any other Supreme Court decision in history.” Michael Herz, The Rehnquist Court and Administrative Law, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 297, 307 n.41 (2004) (quoting 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 3.2 (4th ed. 2002)). However, Chevron was not intended to be so revolutionary. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
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explicitly limited the scope of Chevron deference, they have accepted
litigants’ invitations to identify agency exercises of interpretive power
that entail significant policy judgments and to subtly limit that power
by withholding Chevron deference in such cases.
This limitation on Chevron in turn reflects a persistent attention
to, though not an explicit acknowledgement of, the core principle of
the nondelegation doctrine: the appropriate allocation of policymaking power to the elected, legislative branch. While the Supreme
Court has relied explicitly on the nondelegation doctrine only twice in
its history,6 some Justices and appellate courts have continued to show
a strong sensitivity to the doctrine. Moreover, as I show in this Note,
the Court has issued at least two major opinions that nominally deny
Chevron deference but are more deeply grounded in nondelegation
principles: MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co. 7 and FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.8 Specifically, even though the
agencies’ interpretations in these cases embodied reasonable, if broad,
readings of their statutory powers, the litigants’ abilities to effectively
highlight—through nondelegation principles—the fact that the agencies had exercised those powers so as to make policy choices that
ought to have been made by Congress persuaded the Court to evade
Chevron’s demand for deference.
This thesis joins other attempts to clarify seemingly anomalous
applications of Chevron and to better predict the doctrine’s Russian
roulette–like application.9 Some have argued that these decisions are
best explained by competing theories of interpretation10 or ideologies;11 others have maintained that they have more to do with taking
the temperature of the current Congress and respecting its actual
policy preferences.12 Another scholar, John Manning, has contended
6

See infra Part I.B (discussing history of nondelegation doctrine).
512 U.S. 218 (1994).
8 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
9 For the Russian roulette metaphor, see Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the
Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1091 (1997).
10 Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 51 (2006)
(suggesting that “hypertextualist” judges tend to employ their interpretive preferences).
11 FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
174–75 (2009) (illustrating some ideological effects in Supreme Court’s application of
Chevron).
12 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 765
(2007) (arguing that Court will vacate rules when agency “know[s] that Congress opposes
its substance”) (emphasis added). Note that, unlike Bressman, I do not argue that the
Court is trying to ascertain what the current Congress would enact. Rather, I argue that the
Court starts from a more normative position, asking whether the type of judgment is one
best left to Congress. This distinction explains, for example, MCI v. AT&T, a case with
which Bressman does not engage. See id. at 764 n.22 (noting Bressman’s acknowledgement
that she does not explain MCI); infra Part II.B.2 (exploring MCI).
7
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that one such decision—which I address here as well—resulted from
the Court’s desire to avoid a nondelegation problem in the statute.13
None, however, have linked their explanation to the larger questions of the Court’s discomfort with the shape that Chevron deference
has taken, the role of litigants in molding the Court’s approach, the
strategies that litigants might adopt in light of the Court’s practice,
and the likely resolution of future cases. Further, few have carefully
considered that it may be appropriate for the Court to address its discomfort with Chevron and to employ the nondelegation doctrine
silently and subtly. Along with expanding on and more fully justifying
Manning’s nondelegation-based analysis with additional case examples, support from litigants’ briefs, and a deeper defense of the relevance of the doctrine itself, the goal of this Note is to draw attention
to these more general gaps in the scholarship and to offer both doctrinal context and some potential answers.
The structure of my analysis follows from this set of aims. Part I
sets the stage by briefly discussing the rise of the Chevron doctrine
and the signs that the Court may be interested in backtracking from it,
and then by exploring the history of the nondelegation doctrine and
its continued viability. In Part II, I develop and defend a model of
nondelegation enforcement under the guise of Chevron and then
apply that model to two major agency reversals: MCI v. AT&T and
FDA v. Brown & Williamson. Through a detailed reframing of the
reasoning employed by the Court and discussion of the arguments
advanced by the litigants in these cases, I illustrate that the litigants
were able to motivate the Court to rule, at least in part, in accordance
with the principle of nondelegation.
Finally, in Part III, I briefly explore the complicated normative
implications of the Court’s practice of enforcing nondelegation sub
silentio in light of serious questions of congressional inertia and
administrative legitimacy. Departing from scholars like Manning who
call for a more explicit reliance on nondelegation,14 I caution that such
a shift is both unnecessary, because legislators and litigants have been
able to respond to these cases, and potentially harmful to values like
judicial independence and legislative and administrative efficacy.
13 See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000
SUP. CT. REV. 223 (interpreting Brown & Williamson as application of constitutional
avoidance canon); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549,
611–12 (2009) (discussing generally notion of nondelegation avoidance as canon of
interpretation).
14 Manning, supra note 13, at 228 (arguing that nondelegation operating as canon of
interpretation “undermines, rather than furthers, the constitutional aims” of nondelegation). For my response, see infra Part III.A.
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Indeed, there may be principled reasons to engage in subtle enforcement of nondelegation principles through Chevron review.
I close by presenting and tackling an open question of statutory
interpretation that brings these threads together. Because the ultimate
resolution of this and similar issues may turn on how litigants and the
Court assess the interaction of Chevron deference with the principles
of nondelegation, this Note provides a strategic and doctrinal framework for briefing and deciding future cases while continuing the
appropriately subtle enforcement of nondelegation principles.
I
THE HISTORIES

OF

CHEVRON

AND

NONDELEGATION

A. The Rise and Regrets of the Chevron Regime
In 1984, the Court supplanted a relatively stringent test for deference to agency interpretations of statutes,15 through which the judicial
branch exercised a fairly active role,16 with a far more permissive
regime known as Chevron deference. Under the rule of Chevron,
courts are directed to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous
law as long as they are objectively reasonable.17
To determine whether deference is merited under Chevron, a
court looks for delegated authority to fill implementation gaps in legislation and proceeds formally in two steps.18 First, the reviewing court
is to determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.”19 If it has, the agency must obey the congressional
command, as it is the judgment of the most direct source of democratic policymaking. If Congress has not given an explicit directive,
however, the question for the court in Chevron’s second step is
whether the agency’s statutory interpretation is “based on a permis15 Under this regime, known as Skidmore deference, courts deferred to agency interpretations of statutes only to the extent to which they were subjectively persuasive. See
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of [an agency interpretation] in a particular case will depend upon . . . all those factors which give it power to
persuade . . . .”); see also Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 562 n.95 (1985) (offering list of factors).
16 Under Skidmore, independent administrative authority was constrained not only by
the legislature that drafted the text of the statute, but by the judiciary that determined
what the statute required. This form of judicial review thus created a dual check on the
power of the executive agency that preserved separation of powers principles.
17 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
18 Some scholars dispute the extent to which this division operates in practice. See, e.g.,
Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV.
597, 597–98 (2009) (arguing that analysis determines only whether agency’s interpretation
is permissible interpretation).
19 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (emphasis added).
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sible construction of the statute” in question.20 If the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, then the court must defer to it.21 Chevron
shifts the presumption of deference in favor of the agency: As long as
the statute is ambiguous, and the agency interpretation reasonable,
the court is obligated to set aside its own judgment of the best reading
of the statute and accept that agency’s interpretation as an exercise of
its delegated authority.
This shift is grounded in the recognition that, especially in areas
requiring complex technical expertise, agencies may be better
equipped than the judiciary and Congress to make specific implementation determinations.22 Moreover, agencies are more politically
accountable than the judiciary; they are part of the democratically
elected executive branch and subject to congressional oversight and
budgetary control.23 For these two reasons, interpretation and execution by agencies—expert actors tied to elected branches—are seen as
superior to action by lay actors, especially unelected lay actors like
judges.
Though partially rooted in this notion of accountability, transferring power to agencies through Chevron necessarily means decreasing
the amount of judicial oversight to which they are subjected. Indeed,
judicial determinations under Chevron are no longer an issuance of
the definitive interpretation of a law, but a simple hunt for clarity,
thereby eroding the judicial check on the executive’s power.24
Chevron also signals to Congress that ambiguous legislation and
expansive delegations of authority to fill in gaps are not constitution20 Id. at 843. Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court uses the term “reasonable” in place of
“permissible” to refer to this second-step inquiry. See id. at 845 (“[T]he question . . . [is]
whether the [agency’s] view . . . is a reasonable one.”). I will use both terms synonymously.
21 See id. at 844 (holding that such administrative interpretations are “given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”); see also
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 292 (1988) (“If the agency regulation is not in
conflict with the plain language of the statute, a reviewing court must give deference to the
agency’s interpretation of the statute.”).
22 See Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the Administrative State: The Interrelationship
Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921, 943 (2006)
(noting that Chevron deference is justified in part by agencies’ “specialized or technical
expertise in the subject matter”).
23 See Bressman, supra note 12, at 762 (discussing superior political accountability
of agencies relative to courts); Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through
Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795, 816 (2010) (discussing “the greater democratic
accountability of the [executive branch] than that of unelected judges”).
24 Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power To Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580,
2589 (2006) (describing Chevron as “counter-Marbury for the administrative state”).
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ally problematic.25 Rather, the only disincentive against the passage of
ambiguous legislation is the extent to which Congress wants to make a
definitive policy choice. If the legislature does not want to, Chevron
says that it need not. In fact, Chevron is not the only means by which
agencies have been freed of oversight. Just a year before its decision in
Chevron, the Court ruled in INS v. Chadha that Congress could not
maintain a legislative veto over agency action, thus removing a strong
tool of legislative oversight that had minimized the chance that an
agency would usurp policymaking power.26 The combined effect of
Chadha and Chevron from a separation of powers perspective is to
weaken both legislative and judicial checks on administrative
agencies.
These doctrines vest agencies with wide discretion. However, it is
possible that the Court never intended Chevron to be the revolutionary precedent it has become.27 The Court has therefore begun
“backpedaling in a sporadic effort”28 to make clear “that less agency
action will qualify for Chevron deference”29 by setting up significant
roadblocks to an agency’s access to it. In United States v. Mead Corp.,
for example, the Court held that only where circumstances suggest
that Congress expected that an agency would “speak with the force of
law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute” is Chevron deference
25 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing view of Chevron as signaling end
of nondelegation doctrine); infra notes 42–43 and accompanying text (same).
26 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). At the time, Justice Powell expressed concern
about leaving such sweeping power to agencies. See id. at 959–60 (Powell, J., concurring)
(noting that Congress reasonably viewed legislative veto as “essential” to controlling
administrative agencies).
27 Chevron is often described as a “revolution.” See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1085 (2008) (noting
use of term); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 834 (2001) (same). However, Justice Stevens, the author of the opinion, did not intend
it to be so revolutionary. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188
(2006) (“Justice Stevens . . . had no broad ambitions for the decision; the Court did not
mean to do anything dramatic.”). Reflecting a similar reticence, Justice Breyer has suggested that because “[j]udges do not agree about how absolute Chevron’s approach is
meant to be,” Chevron is better thought of as a “rule of thumb” that “often makes sense,
but not always.” STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING A DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 101, 102–03 (2008).
28 J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Tailoring Deference to Variety with a Wink and a Nod to
Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18, 19 (2010). Goering goes on to argue that Chevron’s
“reign is drawing to a close.” Id. at 22–23. I do not go that far, but such a prediction is
certainly consistent with the observation that the Court is uncomfortable with and seeking
to limit Chevron’s reach.
29 Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 642 (6th Cir. 2004).
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merited.30 Alongside such overt instances of backtracking from
Chevron that have plainly narrowed its scope, I argue that the Court
has further retreated from the original formulation of the test by
subtly incorporating principles about the proper locus of legislative
power.31 As the following section explains, these principles are core
elements of the nondelegation doctrine.
B. The Rise, Fall, and Persistence of the Nondelegation Doctrine
The nondelegation doctrine commands that the legislature may
not delegate legislative power to any other branch of government or
to any private, nongovernmental actor. The doctrine stems not from
any explicit bar on delegation but rather from structural separation of
powers considerations implied by the Vesting Clause of Article I of
the Constitution: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”32 In its strongest form,
the Vesting Clause precludes the exercise of legislative powers by any
other actor and the transfer of those powers by Congress to another
actor.33 Understood more functionally, the nondelegation doctrine
“limits Congress’s ability to make broad, unconditional, and undirected delegations of legislative authority to the executive and administrative agencies.”34 This limitation arose out of a decision at the
Founding that the most electorally accountable branch—a branch that
30 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). Like the more subtle backtracking that is the primary focus
of this Note, “Mead goes part way toward restoring an important aspect of the nondelegation doctrine.” Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules
and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 833 (2002); see also Christensen v. Harris
Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (limiting forms of interpretations meriting deference and
excluding those without force of law). But see Note, Justifying the Chevron Doctrine:
Insights from the Rule of Lenity, 123 HARV. L. REV. 2043, 2049–53 (2010) (arguing that
Mead fails to narrow Chevron’s scope or to resolve its nondelegation problems).
31 The Court said, even before Mead, that the existence of delegated authority is a
“precondition to deference under Chevron.” Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649
(1990). However, the cases that are analyzed in this Note cannot be explained by this “precondition” because, in both, the Court actually engaged in the Chevron analysis, implicitly
accepting that the legislation in question contained a sufficient delegation of gap-filling
authority to do so. In Adams Fruit, on the other hand, the “precondition” operated so as to
keep the Court from applying Chevron in the first instance. See id. at 649–50.
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added); see also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S.
160, 165 (1991) (“From [the Vesting Clause] the Court has derived the nondelegation doctrine . . . .”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) (“The nondelegation
doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite
system of Government.”).
33 See, e.g., Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (“The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is . . . vested [by the Vesting Clause].”).
34 James B. Speta, The Shaky Foundation of the Regulated Internet, 8 J. ON TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 101, 114 n.76 (2010).
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had no role in the enforcement of the law—should make policy.35 As
then-Justice Rehnquist wrote, one of the key salutary effects of the
nondelegation doctrine is that it “ensures . . . that important choices of
social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Government
most responsive to the popular will.”36
The question, of course, is the extent to which that aim should be
balanced against the pursuit of efficient, effective, and expert administration. The Supreme Court’s nondelegation jurisprudence has properly recognized that it is ultimately a question of degree, and a
difficult one at that.37 The greater the discretion left to the delegate,
the greater the latitude to unsettle or change a legislative policy choice
and therefore to raise constitutional concerns by exercising legislative
power.
The Court has given shape to this inquiry by requiring that
Congress “lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle.”38
Essentially, the doctrine is said to require that some legislative choice
has been made. The specificity required of that choice has proven,
however, to be quite minimal.39 Indeed, only twice has the Supreme
Court struck down parts of legislation explicitly on nondelegation
35 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (“When legislative power is united with executive power in a
single person or in a single body of the magistracy, there is no liberty . . . .”); see also
Ginsburg & Menashi, supra note 1, at 254 (“The nondelegation doctrine was once recognized as a foundational principle of the separation of powers.”).
36 Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also Ginsburg & Menashi, supra note 1, at 272 (“[T]he
point of the nondelegation doctrine was to keep the locus of lawmaking power in the
Congress . . . .”).
37 See, e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911) (noting “that it is difficult to define the line which separates legislative power to make laws” from executive
power to make regulations through administrative authority); see also City of Amsterdam
v. Helsby, 332 N.E.2d 290, 299 (N.Y. 1975) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring) (“Delegation is,
after all, a matter of degree . . . .”) (quoting J. Skelly Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice,
81 YALE L.J. 575, 587 (1972) (reviewing KENNETH CULP DAVIS, BEYOND DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE (1971))).
38 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (emphasis
added). In writing the J.W. Hampton opinion, Chief Justice Taft intended to recognize the
doctrine as a “fixture of American constitutional law.” Ginsburg & Menashi, supra note 1,
at 255.
39 The history of the doctrine is one of permitting delegations made with incredibly
vague standards: The principles of fairness, the public convenience, and reasonableness
have all been deemed to provide sufficient guidance. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,
423 (1944) (holding standard that directed Administrator to fix prices “fair[ly] and
equitab[ly]” provided sufficient guidance for Administrator in fulfilling his statutory duty
and for courts in reviewing Administrator’s actions); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
216, 226 (1943) (holding “public interest, convenience, or necessity” provided sufficient
“touchstone”); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693 (1892) (holding presidential determination
of reasonableness per statutory command was “simply in execution” of Act of Congress).
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grounds,40 both times at the height of constitutional upheaval and
interbranch conflict surrounding the advent of New Deal programs,
and both times incurring the wrath of the public and the political
branches as a result.41
The fact that these are the only two such cases has led most commentators and scholars to conclude that the doctrine is no longer in
force.42 After all, the modern administrative state is characterized by a
panoply of agencies with the power to make policy choices, and the
advent of Chevron deference signals the Court’s comfort with, or at
least acquiescence to, that development.43 However, this dismissive
attitude toward the separation of powers is incorrect insofar as it too
narrowly conceives of the nondelegation doctrine as merely contiguous with the “intelligible principle” test, instead of representing a
broader background principle about “the proper allocation of power
in the modern administrative state.”44 The latter issue remains quite
viable; it is debated throughout the lower federal courts45 and con40 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Garry, supra note 22, at 922 (noting that Court has
invalidated laws on nondelegation grounds “only twice”). The Court’s reasoning in these
cases was that Congress had “declare[d] no policy.” Panama Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 415.
41 It was around this time that the Court and President Roosevelt clashed so strongly
that President Roosevelt threatened to “pack” the Court with like-minded Justices by
seeking legislation that would have empowered him to appoint up to six additional Justices.
See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 3–7, 195–96 (2009) (discussing
court-packing plan and public and presidential disapproval of Court).
42 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2002) (dismissing Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry
as “eccentricities”). But see HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 21–22 (1962) (“We still
live under a Constitution which provides that ‘all legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress . . .’; even if a statute telling an agency ‘Here is the problem: deal with
it’ be deemed to comply with the letter of that command, it hardly does with the spirit.”
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1)).
43 See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY 44 (1969) (“[T]he court has upheld many delegations without meaningful standards and even many without any standards.”); Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to
Executive Agencies and the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 276
(1988) (arguing that any enforcement of nondelegation doctrine would “raise[ ] serious
questions about Congress’ ability to function”).
44 Manning, supra note 13, at 236.
45 See infra Part III.B (discussing circuit split with respect to nondelegation and Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) authority); see also Mich. Gambling Opposition v.
Kempthorne, 525 F.3d 23, 34–40 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Brown, J., dissenting) (castigating
majority for thin nondelegation analysis and arguing that no standard was provided to
guide delegate in acquiring land in trust for “whichever Indians he chooses, for whatever
reasons”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1002 (2009); South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 69
F.3d 878, 880–85 (8th Cir. 1995) (concluding similarly), vacated, 519 U.S. 919 (1996);
United States v. Mitchell, 18 F.3d 1355, 1360 n.7 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing in dicta that
Congress could not, consistent with nondelegation doctrine, delegate power to shape fed-
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tinues to garner the attention of Supreme Court Justices.46 Justice
Scalia, for example, dissented from an opinion upholding the constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Commission because he
could “find no place within our constitutional system for an agency
created by Congress to exercise no governmental power other than
the making of laws.”47 Justice Thomas echoed a similar concern in
another case.48
Moreover, then-Justice Rehnquist invoked the doctrine more
explicitly in two early opinions. He famously relied on the nondelegation doctrine in his concurrence in the Benzene Case, a 1980 challenge
to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA)
safety standards for carcinogen exposure.49 Echoing John Locke’s
warning that a representative legislature should “make laws, and
not . . . legislators,”50 Justice Rehnquist wrote that he had “no doubt”
that the provision at issue violated the nondelegation doctrine by
vesting OSHA with unguided power to act as a legislator, and not
merely to implement existing law.51 He exhorted his colleagues “not
to shy away from our judicial duty to invalidate unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority” and argued that the functions served
eral court jurisdiction); cf. Ginsburg & Menashi, supra note 1, at 263–64, 264 n.72 (calling
for return of “a Court that recognizes . . . the nondelegation principle” and describing
doctrine as “too essential a principle of American constitutionalism to disappear entirely”).
Especially given Judge Brown’s dissent, some have suggested a “non-delegation doctrinal
revival.” Jonathan Adler, More Signs of a Non-delegation Doctrinal Revival?, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 9, 2008, 12:51 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/1215622306.shtml.
Moreover, in South Dakota, Justices Scalia, O’Connor, and Thomas dissented from the
Court’s holding vacating the judgment and would have heard argument on the nondelegation issue. 519 U.S. at 920–23.
46 In fact, in private practice, Chief Justice Roberts wrote a petition for certiorari based
entirely on the nondelegation doctrine. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Roberts v. United
States, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000) (No. 99-1174).
47 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Echoing
Judges Wright and Fuchsberg on the question of degree, supra note 37, Justice Scalia
expressed concern that “the degree of generality . . . is so unacceptably high as to amount
to a delegation of legislative powers.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 419 (emphasis omitted).
48 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (indicating Justice Thomas “would be willing to address the question whether our
delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders’ understanding of separation of powers”). Justice Thomas evoked Justice Scalia’s language on the nature of the
nondelegation doctrine, writing, “I believe that there are cases in which the principle is
intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is simply too great for the
decision to be called anything other than ‘legislative.’” Id.
49 Benzene Case, 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
50 Id. at 672 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (quoting John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil
Government, in 2 THE TRADITION OF FREEDOM 44 (Milton Mayer ed., 1957)); see also
Locke, supra, at 44 (“[T]he legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of
making laws and place it in other hands.”).
51 Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 675 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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by the nondelegation doctrine—electoral accountability, policy guidance, and effective judicial review—remain relevant and necessary.52
Joined by Chief Justice Burger, he reprised this reasoning in dissent in
another case involving OSHA safety standards, chastising Congress
for failing to make the “‘hard policy choices’ properly the task of the
legislature.”53
Although these Justices did not carry the Court in these cases
with their explicitly nondelegation-based reasoning, their arguments
indicate that influential members of the Court have been and remain
attuned to the issues raised by the nondelegation doctrine.54 If this is
the case with questions squarely presenting the issue, it is certainly
plausible that the Justices’ receptivity would only increase when litigants present nondelegation issues more subtly and offer the Justices a
chance to bring others on board without explicitly using the nondelegation doctrine, as may be the case in Chevron applications. I turn
now to this possibility.
II
NONDELEGATION CONCERNS MOTIVATE CERTAIN
CHEVRON APPLICATIONS
A. Policing Nondelegation Concerns in the Chevron Context
Given a viable nondelegation doctrine and a Court looking to
limit the license afforded agencies by Chevron, it should not be surprising that the principles behind the nondelegation doctrine also animate the Court’s more subtle efforts to narrow Chevron.55 Justice
52 Id. at 685–86; see also Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery,
116 YALE L.J. 952, 996 (2007) (observing that nondelegation doctrine promotes “rule of
law values” by protecting, among other things, transparency in decisionmaking).
53 Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan (Cotton Dust Case), 452 U.S. 490, 543
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 671 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring)); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 133 (1980) (“That legislators often find it convenient to escape accountability is precisely the reason for a nondelegation doctrine.”); DAVID SCHOENBROD,
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH
DELEGATION 14 (1993) (“Delegation . . . allow[s] our elected lawmakers to hide behind
unelected agency officials. . . . [Congress] often delegate[s] precisely in order to avoid the
hard choices.”).
54 In addition to the cases discussed in this Note, the Court’s decision to strike down
the line-item veto in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), may have been
based on nondelegation grounds. See Steven G. Calabresi, Separation of Powers and the
Rehnquist Court: The Centrality of Clinton v. City of New York, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 85
(2004) (characterizing case as “non-delegation doctrine case masquerading as a bicameralism and presentment case” and as using “the exact language of the nondelegation
doctrine”).
55 For the cases that follow, only this subtler backtracking from Chevron in the form of
the infusion of nondelegation principles can explain the Court’s analysis. Recall that the
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Breyer has alluded to this approach, noting that, when ambiguous
statutory terms concern a question of fundamental policymaking—a
question “of national importance”—such that a reasonable Congress
“is likely to have wanted to decide for itself,” judges should not and
often do not defer to the interpreting agency.56
This is not merely the passing observation of a single Justice.
Rather, instances of this form of nondelegation enforcement appear in
the course of a Chevron inquiry whenever the Court, often at the
insistence of litigants, looks to the scope of the agency’s interpretation
of its own authority and to the interpretation’s policy impact.57 Under
this sort of Chevron analysis, interpretations that would pass the
Chevron test—as either textually clear or definitionally reasonable in
the face of statutory ambiguity—are instead deemed unreasonable
because the agency exercised discretion in such a way as to usurp the
place of Congress as primary policymaker and legislator.
Consider the following model: A vague statutory term has a
range of textually reasonable meanings, yet only a subset of meanings
within that range would not threaten Congress’s role as policymaker.
Agency interpretations in that narrower subset pass muster under
both Chevron and the nondelegation doctrine. Interpretations outside
that subset but within the larger range, however, pass muster only
under Chevron. As the two cases that follow illustrate, even using a
Chevron framework, the Court still may invalidate the latter set of
interpretations based on nondelegation concerns.
Cass Sunstein has considered, in passing, this sort of connection
between nondelegation enforcement and Chevron review, suggesting
that cases such as MCI and Brown & Williamson might be understood
as representing the notion that “[f]undamental alterations in statutory
programs, in the form of contractions or expansions, will not be taken
to be within agency authority.”58 However, Sunstein ultimately discards this reading,59 concluding that those cases are consistent with a
precondition to Chevron deference established in Mead and Adams Fruit denies agencies
access to the Chevron test itself, supra note 31, while the cases discussed in this Part are
explicitly analyzed and decided under Chevron.
56 BREYER, supra note 27, at 103.
57 See infra note 64 (discussing use of nondelegation language in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999)).
58 Sunstein, supra note 27, at 245.
59 Sunstein points to the “uncertain foundations” of the nondelegation doctrine and the
difficulty of creating a metric for its application in Chevron cases. Id. at 245–46. However,
concern for nondelegation principles in Supreme Court and lower court jurisprudence was,
and remains, quite present, see supra Part I.B, and Chevron itself often lacks a clear metric
and gives rise to considerable disagreement about how clear Congress must be to preclude
deference to the agency, see supra notes 9–13 (noting range of approaches). Moreover,
though it may be difficult to articulate how much legislative usurpation is too much in
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pure application of Chevron and do not suggest any backtracking. As
the following sections illustrate, though, MCI and Brown &
Williamson are not consistent with Chevron and do, in fact, evince a
real discomfort with it.60
Others may object to the notion of blending nondelegation and
Chevron review, arguing that they “cannot both be right.”61 However,
that statement is only true to the extent that Chevron is actually a
blank check for agencies. If instead, as I argue, the scope of the
Chevron test has been narrowed and applied with the concerns that
animate the nondelegation doctrine in mind, the two can certainly
coexist.62 One may similarly argue that the two cannot apply in a
single case because the nondelegation doctrine is implicated when a
delegate is given no guidance while Chevron is implicated when an
agency is given vague guidance. Recall, however, that the nondelegation doctrine is a background principle of power allocation broader
than the “intelligible principle” test.63 Framed in this manner,
Chevron and the nondelegation doctrine may fit together quite well as
judicial tools designed to permit the smooth operation of the regulatory state while ensuring that policymaking power stays in the hands
of the legislature, as the Constitution requires.64
general, the Court still may conclude that, in a given case, that line has been reached. Cf.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (acknowledging difficulty of defining hard-core pornography for purposes of First Amendment restrictions but
declaring, “I know it when I see it”). Finally, Sunstein argues that a nondelegation gatekeeper would “embed an unhealthy status quo bias” insofar as it would prevent agencies
from making policy changes. Sunstein, supra note 27, at 246. While this may be true, it only
means that the Court should not be influenced by nondelegation, not that it is not.
60 See infra Part II.B.2 (analyzing MCI as nondelegation-regarding opinion that is
inconsistent with Chevron); infra Part II.B.4 (performing same analysis for Brown &
Williamson).
61 Kmiec, supra note 43, at 286; see also Herz, supra note 5, at 360 (describing common
claim that Chevron made abandonment of nondelegation doctrine possible by embracing
delegation); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section I: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2172 (2004) (“[S]trict enforcement of the
nondelegation doctrine would seem to cut the legs out from under Chevron. . . . [The two
are] pointed in opposite directions . . . .”).
62 For a discussion of why the Court is right to import nondelegation principles into
Chevron sub silentio, see infra Part III.A.
63 Supra note 44 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia recognized the distinction
between the test and the doctrine in his dissent in Mistretta as well, arguing that, in spite of
the fact that the “intelligible principle” test was met, the delegation was unconstitutional
because it was “incompatibl[e] with our constitutional institutions,” meaning in part the
lawmaking function the delegate exercised. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 422
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64 Notably, the Court used the language of the “intelligible principle” test in one
Chevron application. Lisa Schultz Bressman observed that, in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities
Board, the Court invoked Chevron to invalidate an agency’s interpretation as unreasonable because of “the requirement of limiting standards and the prohibition on private law-

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\86-1\NYU107.txt

330

unknown

Seq: 15

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

30-MAR-11

10:08

[Vol. 86:316

One last concern may be precedential: The Court in Whitman v.
American Trucking explicitly held that the nondelegation doctrine
limits only Congress, and not agencies.65 However, this decision at
most forecloses frontal nondelegation challenges to agency action.66 It
does not undermine the conclusion that nondelegation principles
remain strong or that they exert a sub silentio influence on the Court’s
Chevron jurisprudence.
B. Applying the Model
Having developed a lens through which to view Chevron cases
and to detect and describe the role of nondelegation principles, I now
examine two major agency reversals decided under Chevron: MCI v.
AT&T and FDA v. Brown & Williamson.67 I focus on these cases
both because they best illustrate the nondelegation influence and
because each, especially Brown & Williamson, has drawn significant
scholarly attention. I grant that there are many Chevron applications
that may not illustrate the nondelegation influence I explore here, but
it is not my intent to prove otherwise. Rather, I discuss these two cases
making.” Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation
Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1401 (2000). The Court’s holding
that the agency’s interpretation had failed to “apply some limiting standard” and allowed
market participants to determine whether a violation of the rules had occurred, uses the
very language of Schechter Poultry’s and Panama Refining’s applications of the nondelegation doctrine. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388–89 (1999). The Court thus
“invalidated the [agency’s] rule for failing to supply the very limiting standards that had
once been Congress’s responsibility. [It] effectively required the agency . . . to carry forward the lessons of the old nondelegation cases.” Bressman, supra, at 1401.
65 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–73 (2001).
66 It may not even do that. It merely rejected “[t]he idea that an agency can cure an
unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that
power.” Id. at 473. This says nothing about whether an agency may, through its otherwise
reasonable interpretation of a statute, transform a valid delegation of power into an invalid
one and thus activate scrutiny under the nondelegation doctrine.
67 Another potentially illustrative recent case is Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243
(2006). There, the Court held that the Attorney General lacked authority under the
Controlled Substances Act to prohibit prescription of certain drugs for use in physicianassisted suicide. It reached this conclusion after finding that the relevant statutory language
was ambiguous, id. at 258, overlooking a supportive dictionary definition, id. at 283 (Scalia,
J., dissenting), and without ever arguing that the Attorney General’s interpretation was
unreasonable. Instead, the Court reasoned that other provisions of the Act and its context
precluded the extension of Chevron deference. A close look at the reasoning, however,
reveals nondelegation-based impulses. See id. at 262 (arguing that Attorney General’s
interpretation of vague phrases like “public interest” would entail “unrestrained” power to
criminalize and make policy); id. at 267–68 (noting that physician-assisted suicide is “subject of an ‘earnest and profound debate’” that requires policy judgment best reserved to
legislatures (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997))). I focus on MCI
and Brown & Williamson simply because the evidence of the influence of nondelegation
principles is even stronger in those cases.
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to elucidate the persistence of nondelegation principles and litigants’
ability to focus the Court’s attention on them, and relatedly, to
encourage litigants and scholars to pay further attention to the doctrine in future cases.
1.

MCI v. AT&T: The Court’s Reasoning

MCI v. AT&T dealt with a provision of the Communications Act
of 1934 that required common carriers in the telephone industry to file
paperwork with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
listing the rates they charged for different classes of customers.68 The
Act also delegated to the FCC the authority, “in its discretion and for
good cause shown, [to] modify any requirement” under the rate-filing
provision.69 As the composition and technological nature of the
market changed,70 the FCC adjusted the filing requirement, eventually making it optional for all nondominant carriers so as to encourage
competition.71 At the time, the nondominant carriers were essentially
all carriers except AT&T, which had developed a “virtual monopoly”
over national telephone service.72
AT&T challenged the FCC’s authority to promulgate its new
rule, focusing on the statutory term “modify.” It contended that
“modify” connotes only incremental changes and that, by making a
much larger change in the requirement, the FCC had issued what
amounted to a new policy judgment. Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, agreed with that proposition, holding that the meaning of
“modify” was sufficiently clear, based on an array of dictionaries, as to
leave the Court without “the slightest doubt”73 that Congress
intended that the agency have the authority to make only minor
changes.

68

MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
Id. at 224–25 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1988)) (emphasis added).
70 Technology had changed by the 1980s such that the rate-filing requirements had the
effect of inhibiting entry into the market and securing AT&T’s dominance, rather than
checking its monopoly power. See id. at 237–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (summarizing
Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) findings that requirement of filing was
unnecessarily costly to new entrants and that rate-filing would be counterproductive vis-àvis facilitating free market in communications).
71 For a description of the unusually protracted cycle of rulemakings and D.C. Circuit
challenges, see id. at 220–23.
72 Id. at 220.
73 Id. at 228.
69
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MCI v. AT&T: Backtracking from Chevron To Preserve
Nondelegation Principles

Whatever the propriety of the result, glossing over legitimate
ambiguity in the statute to find clarity where little existed was a lessthan-faithful application of the Chevron formula. Instead, Justice
Scalia’s reasoning betrays a more basic, if unspoken, discomfort with
the separation of powers implications of the scope of authority
claimed by the agency’s interpretation. In fact, the opinion is far more
defensible on the latter grounds.
First, the Court relied on a distinction between the dictionary definitions of the supposedly more encompassing “change,” and the supposedly less expansive “modify”—a distinction that is not as clear as
the Court suggested. For example, among the definitions for “change”
offered in one of the dictionaries cited by the Court in its opinion and
elsewhere is “to render different, alter, modify.”74 Moreover, among
the many definitions of “modify” that the Court parsed and approved
is “amend,”75 a word that can permit degrees of change.76
Further, Justice Scalia’s dismissal of the more expansive definition of “modify” contained in Webster’s Third International
Dictionary on the ground that it codified popular, if formally erroneous, usages,77 raises not only the question of whether the Court
should be evaluating dictionaries,78 but also the question of why
74 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 17 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis added). For approval of
this dictionary, see MCI, 512 U.S. at 225.
75 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1004 (6th ed. 1990), quoted in MCI, 512 U.S. at 225;
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236 (2d ed. 1987), quoted in
MCI, 512 U.S. at 225.
76 According to the U.S. Senate, an amendment is “[a] proposal to alter the text of a
pending bill or other measure by striking out some of it, by inserting new language, or
both.” Amendment, U.S. SENATE: REFERENCE HOME, http://www.senate.gov/reference/
glossary_term/amendment.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2011). The Oxford English Dictionary
similarly embraces a potentially expansive definition of “amend.” See 1 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 394, def. 4 (2d ed. 1989) (“To make professed improvements in . . . ; formally,
to alter in detail, though practically it may be to alter its principle, so as to thwart it.”). No
limitation with respect to degree or size is contemplated by the Senate’s conception of an
amendment; in fact, it even “amends” legislation in its entirety. See Amendment in the
Nature of a Substitute, U.S. SENATE: REFERENCE HOME, http://www.senate.gov/reference/
glossary_term/amendment_substitute.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).
77 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1452 (1981) (defining
“modify” as “to make a basic or important change in”), quoted in MCI, 512 U.S. at 225–26.
For Justice Scalia’s criticism of the dictionary’s codification of common usages and
common errors, see MCI, 512 U.S. at 228 n.3.
78 See Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme
Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 321 (1998) (discussing lack of principle behind Court’s dictionary choices and observing that “Justice Scalia’s use of dictionaries . . . appears instrumental . . . , invoked only when it produces the desired result”). Indeed, the Court has
frequently cited to Webster’s Third to find support for statutory interpretations. See, e.g.,
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common usages should be an inappropriate basis for statutory interpretation. After all, legislators may very well indulge in these common
usages or make these same common errors when they write statutes.
Finally, the historical context of the statute indicated that the purpose of the rate-filing requirement was to prevent monopolistic
behavior and keep consumer costs under control.79 With this purpose
in mind, it would be quite surprising if Congress intended to hamstring the FCC from adapting its regulations, including the rate-filing
requirement, so as to best prevent monopolistic behavior as the communications market evolved over time.80 From both purposive and
textual standpoints, then, there was enough room in the statute to
permit deference by the Court.
By issuing a decision that failed to acknowledge this legitimate
ambiguity and that denied deference in a case at least plausibly meriting it, the Court betrayed its concern that Chevron required a result
which would endorse a policy judgment made outside the legislative
branch. In doing so, the Court was guided by nondelegation
principles.
Applying the model developed in Part II.A, the Court actively
framed the FCC’s interpretation so as to place it in the subset of interpretations that, while textually reasonable, still unsettled a congressional policy choice and effected a change of such magnitude as to
effectively wrest policymaking authority from Congress. Indeed, the
Court frequently characterized the rate-filing requirement at issue as
“the centerpiece”81 or “the heart”82 of the Communications Act,
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2721–22 (2010) (defining “service”);
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009) (defining “because of”); Dolan
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (defining “transmission”).
79 See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, § 314, 48 Stat. 1064, 1088
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 314 (2006)) (banning acquisition of ownership or control of assets
of telephone system if “the purpose is and/or the effect thereof may be to substantially
lessen competition . . . or unlawfully to create monopoly in any line of commerce”);
Communications Act § 1, 48 Stat. at 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006))
(declaring Act’s purpose to be “to make available . . . to all the people of the United States
a rapid, efficient . . . communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges”); MCI, 512 U.S. at 237 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that key purpose of Act
was to “guard against abusive practices by wire communications monopolies”).
80 Not only does the text of the Act suggest that its purpose was to counter monopolistic market practices, the New Deal context in which the Act was written was one in
which antimonopolization was a particularly compelling purpose. The New Deal agencies
all were given broad powers to achieve similar ends, and “[i]t is revealing . . . that [Justice
Scalia] never explains how he concludes that the New Deal Congress that so broadly
empowered all the agencies it created, not just the FCC, intended here only a narrow grant
of authority.” Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law,
1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429, 496.
81 MCI, 512 U.S. at 220.
82 Id. at 229.
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instead of crediting the broader principle of antimonopolization.
While this interpretation of the Act is disputable,83 it reflects the
Court’s attention to the question of whether the FCC’s rule was
simply a technical tweaking or a more substantial policy shift—the
introduction of a “whole new regime”84—based on the agency’s own
judgment of good policy in a novel market context.85 By narrowly conceiving of the policy choice expressed by the Act, the Court was able
to hold that the agency had excessively and impermissibly relied on its
own judgment in adjusting the rate-filing requirement, rather than
find that the agency had acted in pursuit of an antimonopolization
goal set by Congress.
The attorneys for AT&T consciously presented the FCC’s action
in those very terms in their brief to the Court, focusing their attention
on the legislative choice embodied in the Act to illustrate that the
FCC had made an independent policy change. Instead of citing
Chevron,86 AT&T cited the Benzene Case and specifically Justice
Rehnquist’s nondelegation concurrence for the propositions that the
FCC’s claim of authority was too “sweeping” to be upheld and that
the Court would have to accept an incredibly low level of congressional guidance as valid if it sustained the FCC’s position.87 AT&T
described the statute’s purpose as simply maintaining “equal and reasonable rates” and repeatedly portrayed the rate-filing requirement as
the “fundamental means” of achieving that purpose,88 devoting an
entire section of the brief to case law designed to prove just that.89
AT&T also warned the Court that the FCC’s interpretation would
grant it license to “eliminate the key tool” for rate enforcement and
thus to “revolutionize the very structure of the Act.”90
83 See id. at 244 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dismissing talismanic characterization of filing
requirement and noting that it is “unsatisfactory substitute[ ] for a reasoned explanation”
of statute’s purposes).
84 Id. at 234.
85 While the majority felt that the FCC had not simply made an adjustment that preserved a fundamental congressional policy choice, the dissenters argued that the FCC had
done exactly that and explicitly framed the issue along those lines. See id. at 245 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (“The FCC . . . [acted] in service of the goals Congress set forth in the Act.”).
In this way, both sides were attuned to the nondelegation principles at play.
86 AT&T did discuss whether the text of the Communications Act, specifically the term
“modify,” could bear the meaning that the FCC had given it, but it did not cite Chevron in
this discussion. Brief for Respondent AT&T at 17–19, MCI, 512 U.S. 218 (Nos. 93-356, 93521).
87 Id. at 22 n.29; see also supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text (discussing Benzene
Case).
88 Brief for Respondent AT&T, supra note 86, at 12. AT&T emphasized five times that
the rate-filing requirement was the “fundamental” part of the Act. Id. at 12, 29, 30, 32, 40.
89 Id. at 29–41.
90 Id. at 22.
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These efforts to direct the Court’s attention to the scope and
character of the agency’s interpretation shaped the Court’s application
of Chevron by offering an analysis consistent with, for example, the
nondelegation basis of Justice Scalia’s dissent in Mistretta v. United
States five years earlier.91 In that opinion, Justice Scalia reasoned that
the agency in question made decisions that were “far from technical,
but [were] heavily laden (or ought to be) with value judgments and
policy assessments.”92 While this may be true, such an inquiry should
not matter for Chevron purposes as long as the statute was ambiguous
with respect to which policies would be permissible. This impulse to
ensure that “bigger” policy determinations are made by the legislative
branch itself, in contrast to “smaller” gap-filling actions more suited to
an administrative agency, is exactly the language of nondelegation.
That the Court was concerned in MCI not only by “the largeness
of the change being effected, but also [the fact] that accepting [the
agency’s interpretation would] entail accepting that an agency can be
empowered to change its mandate”93 is illustrated by contrast to a
similarly expansive interpretation that the Court nonetheless upheld
under Chevron: Babbitt v. Sweet Home.94 In Sweet Home, the Court
granted Chevron deference to the Fish and Wildlife Service’s (FWS)
expansive interpretation of the Endangered Species Act’s (ESA) prohibition on “tak[ing]” endangered species as including habitat modification that kills those species.95 A more limited interpretation, both of
the statute and of the undefined term in question, was certainly available—that “tak[ing]” included only actively killing, capturing, and
maiming.96 But unlike the MCI Court, the Sweet Home Court did not
choose the narrow construction.
A key distinction between the two cases may explain the different
outcomes: the Court’s and litigants’ framing of the policy choices
expressed both by the statutes and the agency’s interpretations
affected the degree to which the nondelegation doctrine was implicated.97 In Sweet Home, the Court described the FWS’s rather
extreme interpretation of statutory language as furthering Congress’s
91

488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 414 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra note 47 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice Scalia’s Mistretta opinion).
93 Strauss, supra note 80, at 495.
94 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
95 Id. at 703.
96 Indeed, the dissent adopted just such a view. Id. at 717–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97 Granted, one explanation for the differing outcomes may merely be a shifting judicial coalition. In the interest of finding coherence in the law, however, I set aside such an
explanation.
92
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overarching policy goal of protecting endangered species.98 As a
result, this became a more straightforward Chevron case for the
Court; the statute left the specific practices to be enjoined, and the
degree to which they would be so prohibited, to the agency’s expertise
as a matter of implementation and of determining and weighing relevant costs and benefits.99
A significant reason for the Court’s willingness to defer to the
agency in Sweet Home was likely the fact that, because the issue was
not argued, the Court did not perceive any nondelegation problem.
Unlike AT&T, the litigants challenging the agency failed to construct
a contrary story about the statute and the policy judgments that it contained. Instead, they conceded its broad purpose and focused their
arguments entirely on Chevron and statutory interpretation.100 By
failing to raise the kind of nondelegation-based arguments advanced
by AT&T in MCI,101 the challengers in Sweet Home missed an opportunity to influence the Court’s Chevron application by injecting
nondelegation principles into their arguments and ultimately lost their
case.102
The contrary results in these cases thus illustrate both the vitality
of nondelegation principles and the power of litigants to influence the
Court’s Chevron analysis by raising them. The Court in Sweet Home
took a broad view of the policy judgment embodied in the ESA and
consequently saw the agency as merely serving its congressionally
determined purpose. The Court in MCI, in contrast, adopted AT&T’s
narrower view of the policy judgment in the Communications Act
and, parroting AT&T’s brief, portrayed the FCC as having made
independent, substantive policy choices constituting a “fundamental
revision” of the statute.103 In other words, litigants led the MCI Court
to see an agency interpretation that presented a usurpation of legisla98 See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 698 (“[T]he broad purpose of the ESA supports the
[EPA’s] decision to extend protection against activities that cause the precise harms
Congress enacted the statute to avoid.”); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180
(1978) (describing ESA as “the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of
endangered species ever enacted by any nation” meant “to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved” (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1976)).
99 See supra Part I.A (discussing purposes of Chevron).
100 Brief for Respondents at 7–8, 8–35, Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687 (No. 94-859) (conceding that “Petitioners are correct that Congress was concerned with the need to preserve
vital habitat for endangered species” and engaging in statutory interpretation analysis).
101 There is not a single reference to the Benzene Case and only a single, unrelated
reference to MCI in the entire brief. Id.
102 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708.
103 MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994); see supra note 88
(noting AT&T’s use of word “fundamental”).
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tive power. Correctly recognizing the problems of voicing nondelegation principles outright,104 AT&T and the Court used the guise of
Chevron but argued and ruled with nondelegation principles in mind.
Only a Court profoundly uncomfortable with the consequences of a
strict Chevron application would have adopted that kind of
reasoning.105
3.

FDA v. Brown & Williamson: The Court’s Reasoning

FDA v. Brown & Williamson dealt with the Food and Drug
Administration’s (FDA) authority to regulate tobacco products.106
Since 1938, the FDA has had the authority under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to regulate “drugs” and “devices.”107 The Act
as then in force defined “drugs” in relevant part as “articles (other
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body”108 and a “device” as “an instrument . . . or other similar or
related article . . . which is . . . intended to affect the structure or any
function of the body.”109 After decades of explicitly disavowing the
authority to regulate tobacco under the FDCA, the FDA issued a rule
in 1996 in which it determined that nicotine was a “drug,” that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco were delivery “devices” thereof, and
that it had the power to regulate them.110 It therefore issued regulations with respect to the labeling, advertising, and sale of cigarettes
and tobacco111 but declined to ban them altogether.112
Brown & Williamson and other major tobacco manufacturers
challenged the new rule on the grounds that the FDA had exceeded
its statutory authority. As with AT&T’s similar allegation in MCI, the
Court claimed to examine this contention under Chevron, asking first
if Congress spoke directly to the precise issue and, if not, whether the
104

See infra Part III.A (defending sub silentio nondelegation enforcement).
This is “not [a] faithful application[ ] of Chevron, [but it is] nonetheless understandable as a form of nondelegation review”—a policing of the proper scope of legislative
authority. Bressman, supra note 64, at 1412.
106 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000).
107 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified as amended 21 U.S.C. §§ 321–360 (2006)).
108 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994).
109 Id. § 321(h)(3).
110 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 127 (quoting Regulations Restricting the Sale and
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61
Fed. Reg. 44396, 44397, 44402 (Aug. 28, 1996)).
111 The regulations required, among other things, that sellers verify the age of all purchasers under twenty-seven, that smokeless tobacco not be sold to individuals under eighteen, and that cigarettes be sold in quantities greater than twenty. They also prohibited
vending machines (except in adult-only locations) and free samples and set advertising
restrictions. Id. at 128–29 (summarizing regulations).
112 See id. at 139 (noting FDA’s reason for not banning cigarettes altogether).
105
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FDA’s interpretation was a reasonable one.113 In her opinion for a
closely divided Court, Justice O’Connor held that Congress had
spoken directly to the issue, and that it had precluded the FDA from
exercising jurisdiction over tobacco products.
Departing from Justice Scalia’s textual methodology in MCI,
Justice O’Connor reached this conclusion by exploring the broader
context in which federal tobacco regulations operate. She argued that
subsequent to the passage of the FDCA, Congress passed a series of
tobacco-related acts mandating health warnings, advertising blackouts, and other requirements, thus “ratif[ying]” the FDA’s declination
of power and “preclud[ing] any role for the FDA.”114 Moreover,
according to the Court’s reasoning, if the FDA found that tobacco was
unsafe, it must ban the drug altogether in order to maintain fidelity to
the FDCA, which required that any product regulated by the FDA be
safe for use. The new regulation was therefore underinclusive, but
since Congress foreclosed the removal of tobacco from the market,
the FDA could not issue a properly inclusive rule either.
Tellingly, Justice O’Connor closed her opinion by noting that “the
nature of the question presented” influences the Chevron inquiry and
that in “extraordinary cases” the Court may “hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended” a delegation of authority.115
Noting that “[t]his is hardly an ordinary case”116 and citing MCI as
“instructive” on this point, she wrote that Congress was unlikely to
make a delegation of such “economic and political significance.”117
For this reason, and because of the subsequent legislation surrounding
tobacco regulation, the Court held that the FDA’s interpretation of
the FDCA failed Chevron at the first step.118
4.

FDA v. Brown & Williamson: Backtracking from Chevron To
Preserve Nondelegation Principles

Perhaps even more than MCI, this case is a striking departure
from standard Chevron applications. Taken at its word, Chevron
would require the Court to determine whether “drug” was an ambiguous term and, if it was, to decide whether the FDA’s inclusion of
nicotine was a reasonable construction of that term.119 Of course, the
113

Id. at 132.
Id. at 144. One such key piece of legislation was the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act (FCLAA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (2006).
115 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 160.
118 Id. at 160–61.
119 See supra Part I.A (discussing Chevron).
114
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Court could not deny that the literal meaning of the statute sustained
the FDA’s position.120 Further, to say otherwise, the Court would
have had to grapple with the fact that the FDA’s position was entirely
consistent with the broad purpose of the FDCA: the protection of
public health. In fact, the Court had earlier held that this was the
statute’s purpose and, to boot, that the FDCA was to be given a “liberal construction” consistent with that “overriding purpose.”121 Given
the threat that the FDA concluded cigarettes pose to public health,122
their regulation by the FDA would seem to serve those purposes.123
For these reasons, the Court could not just adopt a narrow view of the
policy judgment contained in the statute as it had done in MCI.
More than creating sufficient ambiguity to reach Chevron’s reasonableness step, as I argue would have been appropriate in MCI,124
this evidence may even support the argument that the statute unambiguously favored the FDA’s position.125 As with MCI, however, I do
not intend to decisively prove that. Rather, I mean to demonstrate
that the type of analysis in which the Court engaged was not that of a
typical Chevron inquiry. By disregarding Chevron’s “threshold question” of text126 and instead relying on subsequent legislation, itself “a
hazardous basis”127 for interpreting statutes, the Court engaged in an
120 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 162 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In fact, the Court
reached its conclusion “without ever interpreting the FDCA’s operative language.”
Manning, supra note 13, at 225. If it had, it would have had to address the fact that nicotine
and tobacco fit squarely within the statutory text. Indeed, the FDA explicitly found as
much in an exercise of the very agency-specific expertise that provided one of the foundations for the Chevron doctrine. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 127–28 (describing
FDA’s medical and scientific findings).
121 United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969).
122 See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 191 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing FDA
statistics on nicotine addiction).
123 The majority also argued that the FDA, if it acted at all, would have to ban cigarettes
entirely and in contravention of specific congressional legislation. However, as the dissenters pointed out, the specific language in the FDCA regarding the banning of devices
uses the discretionary term “may” instead of the mandatory term “must” when describing
the FDA’s response to a device’s risk of injury. Id. at 175 (Breyer, J., dissenting). More
centrally, “the statute plainly allows the FDA to consider the relative, overall ‘safety’ of a
device in light of its regulatory alternatives,” and when the FDA exercised its expertise to
conclude that a ban was a more dangerous alternative than some other regulation, it fulfilled its statutory obligation to protect the public health. Id. at 175–76 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
124 See supra Part II.B.2.
125 At least, “[b]ecause either interpretation is reasonable, under Chevron the FDA’s
reading is entitled to deference.” Molot, supra note 10, at 68.
126 Manning, supra note 13, at 234; see also id. (noting that Court’s reasoning was not
based on text of FDCA).
127 United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960).
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“approach that differed [so] markedly” from usual applications of
Chevron 128 that one must ask what ultimately drove the decision.
It is possible, of course, to see this as a purely political opinion.129
There is a far more principled explanation, though: Using the model
developed in Part II.A and applied above with respect to MCI, it is
apparent that the Court was motivated by the litigants to consider that
the FDA’s exercise of its statutory authority threatened Congress’s
primacy as policymaker and legislator—a core principle of the
nondelegation doctrine. Lacking any textual analysis, the Court’s reasoning is ultimately based on the force of subsequent legislation and
on Justice O’Connor’s assertion that this was an “extraordinary
case[ ]” warranting departure from Chevron.130 Both are analytic
points much better suited to the nondelegation doctrine than to
Chevron.
As for the subsequent legislation argument, the Court has repeatedly, and correctly, dismissed subsequent legislation as a tool of statutory interpretation, reasoning that the meaning of decades-old statutes
cannot be inferred from legislation passed by an entirely different
Congress unless the later law explicitly amends the prior law.131
Notably, the Court in this case never contended that the subsequent
legislation shed any light on what “drug” means in the FDCA.
Instead, it argued that the subsequent legislation was relevant because
it shed light on current congressional policy judgments with respect to
tobacco regulation.132
While it may be true that subsequent legislation conveys present
congressional judgment, attention to this judgment is more relevant to
a nondelegation-sensitive analysis than it is to a Chevron analysis,
simply because Chevron does not ask for the opinion of the current
128

Garry, supra note 22, at 950.
Cf. supra note 97 (rejecting political explanation of Sweet Home in interest of finding
coherence).
130 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
131 See Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 632 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Arguments based on subsequent legislative history . . . should not be taken seriously, not even in
a footnote.”); United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 (1968) (holding that subsequent legislative history is of “very little, if any, significance” (quoting Rainwater v. United
States, 356 U.S. 590, 593 (1958))); CROSS, supra note 11, at 67 (“Even strong advocates of
the general use of legislative history often reject judicial reliance on post-enactment legislative history unless it is in the context of legislative action to amend or renew the earlier
legislation.”); see also Manning, supra note 13, at 263 (“The post-FDCA legislation did not
reenact, amend, or in any way address the FDCA’s jurisdictional language. . . . For good
reason . . . the Court generally refuses to treat a subsequent Congress’s interpretation of a
statute as meaningful evidence of an earlier Congress’s intent.”).
132 As the dissenters argued, though, even that subsequent legislative history was “critically ambivalent” with respect to the relevant congressional policy judgment. Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
129
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Congress. However, like the Brown & Williamson opinion, a decision
sensitive to nondelegation principles would credit as persuasive, and
perhaps dispositive, the fact that the agency’s choice would be irreconcilable with the current legislative landscape.133 Further, such an analysis would protect legislative primacy by rebuking the agency for
exercising statutory authority that transgresses the boundary between
gap-filling and policymaking, as was the case in MCI. In Brown &
Williamson, the Court did exactly that: Because it decided that “the
decisions Congress had not made regarding tobacco control strategies
superseded and precluded FDA regulation,”134 the majority’s reasoning relied less on statutory interpretation than on the preservation
of congressional policymaking supremacy. Framed as striking down an
agency rule “because of the failure of Congress to have reached a
decision on that particular topic,”135 Brown & Williamson is analogous to Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry, as the Court decided
each on the reasoning that “Congress must make the big decisions”136
and that the agency had done so instead. This kind of logic is essentially that of the nondelegation doctrine.
Justice O’Connor’s “extraordinary cases” language directly
exposes that this logic was at play in the majority’s decision in Brown
& Williamson. By relying on the significance of the specific choice in
question, the Court made a normative judgment about what kinds of
decisions Congress, rather than a given agency, ought to make, instead
of a descriptive judgment of what kinds of decisions Congress actually
allowed the agency to make through its organic statute.137 It thereby
imposed the logic of the nondelegation doctrine and treated this case
differently from others presenting textual ambiguities.
The litigants themselves likely planted the seeds of this concern.
The briefs filed by the tobacco companies, like that filed by AT&T in
MCI and unlike that filed by the challengers in Sweet Home, successfully framed the case from a nondelegation posture and relied heavily
on separation of powers principles instead of on Chevron. R.J.
133 See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR
LEGISLATION 103 (2008) (framing Court’s core complaint as being that agency “was deviating from the most recent official indications of enactable political preferences”).
134 James T. O’Reilly, Chevron Goes Up in Smoke: Did the Supreme Court Reward
Gridlock Tactics in the Cigarette Decision?, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10574, 10575 (2000).
135 Id. at 10576.
136 Herz, supra note 5, at 360 (attributing that constitutional and normative sentiment to
Justices Thomas and Scalia, based on their American Trucking opinions).
137 See supra text accompanying note 56 (discussing Justice Breyer’s similar approach);
see also Herz, supra note 5, at 360 (describing one reading of Brown & Williamson
asserting that case “rest[s] on a normative rather than descriptive basis, reflecting an insistence that Congress must, rather than will, make the major policy decisions”).
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Reynolds, one of the tobacco company respondents, opened its brief
with the claim, “This case is about who has the power to make
national policy” with respect to tobacco.138 It went on to describe the
FDA as engaging in “policy-making of a kind suitable only for
Congress” and as “usurp[ing] the role of Congress as the initiator of
major change . . . or in the wholesale reorientation” of tobacco
policy.139 It even drew an analogy to MCI and the Court’s similar
judgment in that case.140
Finally, R.J. Reynolds devoted a section of its brief to a series of
nondelegation citations, including Benzene and J.W. Hampton, gesturing towards the model of agency violation developed in Part II.A
and arguing that, if the text of the FDCA could bear so standardless
an interpretation as to allow tobacco regulation, the statute would run
afoul of the nondelegation doctrine.141 The nondelegation analysis
was not merely a series of passing references, but rather a thread that
tied the brief together and put the issue on the Court’s radar. Indeed,
the Fourth Circuit accepted this framing of the case below, describing
the case as “[a]t its core . . . about who has the power to make this
type of major policy decision.”142
At the same time, the tobacco companies’ briefs in Brown &
Williamson barely reference Chevron at all. The brief for respondents
Philip Morris & Lorillard never uses the word,143 and the brief for
Brown & Williamson first references the case in the penultimate paragraph of the argument section, and then to argue only that it did not
apply because the scope of the FDA’s action was too large to merit
138 Brief for Respondent R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. at 1, FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (No. 98-1152).
139 Id. at 9–10; see also Brief for Respondents Philip Morris Inc. & Lorillard Tobacco
Co. at 48, Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120 (No. 98-1152) (“Simply put, FDA has appropriated Congress’ constitutional authority to make major national policy.”).
140 Brief for Respondent R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., supra note 138, at 23; see also
Brief for Respondents Philip Morris Inc. & Lorillard Tobacco Co., supra note 139, at 5
(quoting language from MCI referenced at note 84, supra).
141 Brief for Respondent R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., supra note 138, at 33–34. R.J.
Reynolds discussed these cases to argue that the FDA would lack a standard for regulating
tobacco products, posing a nondelegation problem. Later in the brief, R.J. Reynolds also
cited the Court’s holding that agency deference cannot permit the “unauthorized assumption . . . of major policy decisions properly made by Congress.” Id. at 48–49 (quoting
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 97
(1983)); see also Brief for Respondents Philip Morris Inc. & Lorillard Tobacco Co., supra
note 139, at 48–49 (arguing that FDA’s position would “do violence to established principles of separation of powers”) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 307–08
(1979)).
142 Brown & Williamson v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 176 (4th Cir. 1998). The Fourth Circuit
also cited to MCI for this proposition, making the very connection between the two cases
drawn in this Note. Id.
143 Brief for Respondents Philip Morris Inc. & Lorillard Tobacco Co., supra note 139.
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Chevron deference.144 This presentation, which mirrors the organization of AT&T’s brief in MCI, further highlighted for the Court the
extent to which nondelegation principles predominated.
The picture that emerges from these cases is that the Court was
influenced by the litigants’ nondelegation pitches and was accordingly
troubled by the separation of powers implications of the results that
Chevron would have yielded. So motivated, the Court “dissemble[d]”145 and “sacrifice[d] the most likely or natural meaning of a
statute in order to advance extrastatutory,”146 constitutional conclusions offered by the litigants about the proper locus of policymaking
power. The next Part argues that the Court’s sub silentio nondelegation enforcement, though imperfect, is the best available approach.
III
IMPLICATIONS

AND

EXPECTATIONS

A. Costs and Benefits of Subtle Nondelegation
Given the Court’s discomfort with the scope of Chevron deference and its apparent willingness to accept arguments against deference that are rooted in nondelegation principles, one might expect the
Court to explicitly acknowledge both its own important retooling of
administrative law and the vitality of an important doctrine of the separation of powers.147 Prominent scholars and judges, including John
Manning and Judge Douglas Ginsburg, have called for the Court to do
so, arguing that it should enforce the nondelegation doctrine directly
144 Brief of Respondent Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. at 37–38, Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. 120 (No. 98-1152). R.J. Reynolds also argued that Chevron should
not apply because the question involved multiple statutes, most of which are not administered by the FDA. Brief for Respondent R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., supra note 138, at
47–48.
145 Merrill & Hickman, supra note 27, at 912. Merrill and Hickman argue that Brown &
Williamson illustrates that an exception to Chevron’s application exists in cases that
“involve ambiguities about the scope of an agency’s jurisdiction.” Id. at 845; see also Ernest
Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV.
989, 1018 (1999) (arguing that, when extending jurisdiction, agencies are “no longer filling
gaps but annexing new territory”). However, as Sweet Home illustrates, see supra notes
94–102 and accompanying text, “[t]he problem with this [jurisdictional exception] claim is
that every statutory interpretation implicates the scope of agency jurisdiction, by defining
what comes within the statutes over which the agency has uncontested jurisdiction.”
ELHAUGE, supra note 133, at 104.
146 Manning, supra note 13, at 256.
147 See Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A
Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW.
U. L. REV. 1239, 1327 (2002) (“The Court’s attempt to place itself in the position of
Congress—and to ask whether Congress likely would have wanted to delegate a particular
question to an administering agency—is precisely the sort of practice that characterized the
pre-Chevron case law and that Chevron rejected.”).
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and forthrightly.148 The Court has not, however, taken that invitation,
and rightly so, because such a shift is unnecessary and would entail
potentially dramatic adverse consequences.
Granted, there is something deeply unsatisfying about the Court’s
lack of forthrightness. As Manning notes, when the Court obscures
the basis of its decision, it “makes it less likely that Congress will ever
clarify its unconstitutionally vague policies” through formal
processes.149 And when the Court twists statutory language to reach
an acceptable result,150 it arguably sacrifices predictability and legitimacy.151 Moreover, the sub silentio pursuit of nondelegation principles appears to blame the agencies in question for being “bad”
interpreters when, in reality, the blame rests with Congress for writing
a statute that delegates more policymaking power than the Court is
comfortable sanctioning. By holding the agency responsible, the Court
may encourage agencies to be overly cautious and wary of testing the
boundaries of their delegated authority,152 while failing to discourage
Congress from legislating vaguely.
While these are legitimate judicial process concerns, neither MCI
nor Brown & Williamson produced a confused Congress, an agency
unsure of how to proceed, or litigants unsure about what principles to
draw from the cases. Indeed, Congress has responded to each case by
restoring the agency’s authority and thereby expressly making the
policy choice that the agency had tried to make, notably in response to
significant public pressure in the tobacco context.153 The fact that the
148 See Manning, supra note 13, at 257 (arguing that, insofar as Court does enforce
nondelegation, “it should not employ the avoidance canon to do so,” and instead “should
displace a duly enacted statute only if it concludes that such statute has effected an unconstitutional delegation”); supra note 45 (noting Judge Ginsburg’s nondelegation advocacy).
149 Manning, supra note 13, at 260 (emphasis omitted).
150 See Molot, supra note 147, at 1325–27 (deriding Brown & Williamson for
“sacrific[ing] transparency and accessibility,” “creat[ing] unnecessary uncertainty,” and
“mak[ing] judicial review . . . less predictable than it might otherwise be”). Similarly, the
MCI opinion is written as a strong, unequivocal determination that the Court’s interpretation is the only possible one. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228
(1994) (“We have not the slightest doubt that is the meaning the statute intended.”).
151 See Manning, supra note 13, at 252 (arguing that doing so “disturb[s] the very choice
or compromise that the legislative process has produced”).
152 See R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L.
REV. 245, 246 (1992) (“Judicial review has subjected agencies to debilitating delay and
uncertainty.”).
153 Congress responded to the Court’s opinions in MCI and Brown & Williamson by
amending the Communications Act in 1996 and the FDCA in 2009 to explicitly give the
FCC and FDA, respectively, the authority they attempted to exercise in the first instance.
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (amending Communications Act); Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (codified
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (amending FDCA).
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Court’s opinions obscured the specific reason for the decisions did not
prevent these congressional responses. Moreover, the fact that the
Court did not explicitly bring nondelegation principles to the surface
in MCI did not prevent the Brown & Williamson litigants from
drawing heavily from them, and from the MCI opinion itself, in their
briefs either.154 Indeed, while forthrightness is an admirable virtue,
the not-so-secret nature of this nondelegation “secret” has meant that
its silence has harmed neither policymakers nor litigants.
Even still, is forthrightness a virtue worth pursuing for its own
sake? The impracticality of a full-throated nondelegation revival
counsels against doing so. As alluded to in Part I.B, the nondelegation
doctrine requires a degree of balancing to be at all practicable. The
legislative process is exceedingly difficult,155 and it is all too common
in the case of massive regulatory legislation for a series of one-time
bargains to be made that would be difficult or impossible to replicate
in a new political context, let alone in a Congress with different members.156 If the Court were forced to strike down even one provision of
a statute on nondelegation grounds, the regulatory structure built
around it could weaken and be difficult to rebuild.157 After all, it does
not require much imagination to foresee that major legislation like the
Communications Act would be far more difficult to pass now than
during the New Deal. Faced with such a high bar, Congress might
abandon the project or just do the bare minimum, leaving areas of the
economy and the environment unregulated, and leaving agencies
unable to fill the void.
Relatedly, agencies in a world of strong nondelegation might find
themselves without the tools, statutory or political, to do even the jobs
properly delegated to them. Indeed, a strong nondelegation doctrine
154 See supra notes 138–44 and accompanying text (discussing nondelegation principles
in Brown & Williamson brief); supra notes 140, 142 and accompanying text (noting MCI
references).
155 Cf. supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing dissatisfaction with congressional
inertia).
156 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 2–23 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing saga of drafting, negotiation process, and ultimate passage of Civil Rights Act of
1964); cf. Elisabeth Goodridge & Sarah Arnquist, A History of Overhauling Health Care,
NYTIMES.COM, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/07/19/us/politics/20090717_
HEALTH_TIMELINE.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2011) (collecting series of articles on legislative events eventually leading to passage of major healthcare reform in 2010).
157 The Court could certainly sever the statutory provisions, as it did in Schechter
Poultry and Panama Refining. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
However, in the case of the FDA, for example, striking the provision defining the word
“drug” as insufficiently clear while leaving the rest of the FDCA intact would paralyze the
FDA.
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could preclude large swaths of agency rulemaking.158 Agencies fearful
of litigation may also simply decline to do more than the statute’s minimum requirements, slowing down the pace of regulation and regulatory change.159 In fact, just as the Court might make agencies overly
cautious by directing its disapproval at them instead of at Congress, a
full-throated nondelegation doctrine could have the same effect. At
the very least, agencies would have to devote more of their limited
time and resources to defending themselves in court.
Finally, the nondelegation doctrine has developed a terrible historical reputation.160 The Court’s decisions throughout the twentieth
century have made it very difficult to reverse course and frontally
enforce the doctrine in the future.161 When the Court attempted to do
so during the New Deal,162 it was openly threatened with President
Roosevelt’s notorious court-packing plan and met with public disapproval.163 The administrative state has become only more entrenched
since then,164 and just ten years ago, in American Trucking, the Court
seemed to hold that agency action cannot be subject to frontal
nondelegation challenges.165 Announcing a strong revival of the
nondelegation doctrine now would likely provoke an even more
intense backlash.
Indeed, while Manning’s call for nondelegation enforcement to
be vocal if done at all is attractive in theory, it gives insufficient credit
to the impracticability of such an approach. The path the Court
charted in MCI and Brown & Williamson, however, pursues impor158 One may even wonder if the Administrative Procedure Act would be constitutional
under a strong nondelegation doctrine, since the Act provides procedures through which
agencies may make rules that “prescribe law or policy,” which is certainly similar to exercising legislative power. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006) (defining agency “rule”).
159 Cf. Burt Neuborne, “The House Was Quiet and the World Was Calm the Reader
Became the Book,” 57 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2038 n.100 (2004) (noting problem of “rule
book slowdown” when entities slavishly follow text).
160 See Herz, supra note 5, at 358 (“[T]he current Justices, like their predecessors, have
concluded that a nondelegation doctrine with teeth would be unmanageable and unenforceable in a consistent way.”).
161 See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text (discussing flexible, and permissive,
“intelligible principle” test).
162 See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); supra Part I.B (discussing cases).
163 See supra note 41 (discussing disapproval faced by Court); cf. Ginsburg & Menashi,
supra note 1, at 260 (noting that judges’ expression of enthusiasm for nondelegation doctrine in nineteenth century was “overmatched by their reluctance to confront the
legislature”).
164 See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 437, 437 (2003) (discussing expansion of administrative state and “dramatic rise in
the scope and intensity of administrative regulation”).
165 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–73 (2001). The meaning of the
opinion is subject to debate. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
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tant nondelegation principles within an accepted yet malleable doctrine that preserves the administrative state, specific regulatory
structures, and “good interbranch relations.”166 While far from perfect, the Court’s current form of nondelegation enforcement has not
damaged the ability of Congress, agencies, or regulated entities to
respond to and understand the Court’s holdings, and it largely preserves the agency’s voice and expertise in an increasingly complicated
policy process by giving the agency a chance to try again with a new
regulation instead of sending the issue back to Congress by invalidating the statute.
B. Addressing Nondelegation Questions Waiting in the Wings
All of these issues—the vitality of the nondelegation doctrine, the
Court’s reluctance to follow through on Chevron, the power of litigants to capitalize on both in order to shape outcomes in their favor,
and the Court’s apparent practice to engage with it all sub silentio—
have implications for open interpretive questions, the resolution of
which may well turn on the degree to which litigants and courts frame
the demands of nondelegation principles as persuasive or controlling.
To take but one example,167 another provision of the FDCA
criminalizes certain failures, as determined by the Department of
Health and Human Services, to maintain records during the trial and
testing of new prescription drugs.168 Because the statute arguably
places the entire burden of record keeping on manufacturers alone,
and not on individual researchers,169 three courts of appeals have
166

Bressman, supra note 13, at 617.
In addition to the issue discussed here, a similar question may come to the Supreme
Court by way of a series of decisions regarding whether an agency may receive Chevron
deference when it fills a gap created by a prior judicial decision striking down a piece of a
statute. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have held that it may, see A.T. Massey Coal Co. v.
Barnhart, 472 F.3d 148, 168 (4th Cir. 2006); Sidney Coal Co. v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 427 F.3d
336, 348–49, 351 (6th Cir. 2005); Pittston Co. v. United States, 368 F.3d 385, 403–04 (4th
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, Brink’s Co. v. United States, 544 U.S. 904 (2005), while the Fifth
Circuit has held that it may not, see Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 503 (5th Cir.
2007), cert. denied, Kickapoo Traditional Tribe v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 32 (2008). I focus on the
FDCA question instead because of the sharpness of the circuit split in the context of a
specific statute, which is more akin to the cases discussed in this Note.
168 21 U.S.C. § 331(e) (2006) imposes criminal penalties for, among other things, failures
to “establish or maintain” records required under 21 U.S.C. § 355(i). Section 355(i), in
turn, requires the keeping of certain records as promulgated “within the discretion of the
Secretary [of Health and Human Services].” Id. § 355(i)(1). The combined effect is to
criminalize failures to keep records as required by the agency.
169 The relevant portion of the statute says that the Secretary may condition the exemption to premarket approval requirements on the submission of reports and records “by the
manufacturer or the sponsor of the investigation of such drug,” id. § 355(i)(1) (emphasis
added), and not by the researcher. On the other hand, section 355(i) begins by delegating
to the Secretary the authority to set “other conditions relating to the protection of the
167
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been presented with the question of whether a regulation that subjects
researchers to those same requirements, and therefore to the threat of
criminal sanctions, is permissible under the statute. Each court has
decided the issue in a different way. One rejected the regulation on
the grounds of nondelegation principles, one upheld the regulation as
reasonable under Chevron, and one upheld the regulation as clearly
authorized by the statute.
The Ninth Circuit was the first to examine the question.170 In reasoning similar to that which was later used by the Supreme Court in
MCI and Brown & Williamson, the court, while seeming to apply a
Chevron-like standard, actually gave voice to nondelegation principles.171 Though not citing Chevron, likely because it was decided only
two months earlier, the court nonetheless appeared to follow its
form.172 After determining that the statute was vague as to the
authority to regulate researchers, the court held that it would be
unreasonable to read the statute to delegate that authority.173 Its discomfort with that reading, however, turned not on the statutory language, but primarily on the normative conviction that “legislatures . . .
should define criminal activity”174 and that the guidance given to the
agency was insufficient to support a regulation criminalizing conduct
“only questionably within its ambit.”175 These are the kind of principles that support the nondelegation doctrine, not Chevron.
When the Eighth Circuit took up the same question ten years
later, it explicitly applied a Chevron framework and held that the
statute was ambiguous but that the agency had reasonably interpreted
the statute given legislative history suggesting that conditions other
than those enumerated in the statute may be imposed.176 Indeed, only
public health,” id., suggesting that singling out manufacturers may not have been meant to
be exclusive of others.
170 United States v. Smith, 740 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1984).
171 The court’s concern took the form of the rule of lenity, which requires that criminal
sanctions be clearly required by statute. Id. The more broadly applicable principle that
must be drawn from the court’s reasoning, though, is certainly one of nondelegation. After
all, one of the key purposes of the rule of lenity is to ensure that only the legislature makes
the kind of consequential policy judgment that comes with the imposition of criminal sanctions. Id. The Eighth Circuit’s later discussion of Smith explicitly framed the case as a
nondelegation doctrine case. United States v. Garfinkel, 29 F.3d 451, 454 (8th Cir. 1994);
see also Note, supra note 30, at 2054–59 (similarly framing rule of lenity as one limiting
policymaking discretion).
172 Smith, 740 F.2d at 739.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 738 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971)).
175 Id.
176 Garfinkel, 29 F.3d at 456, 458. The district court had followed and adopted the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion in Smith, including its nondelegation reasoning. See United States v.
Garfinkel, 822 F. Supp. 1457, 1460–61 (D. Minn. 1993), rev’d, 29 F.3d 451 (8th Cir. 1994).
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by finding that a sufficient policy judgment had been made by the
legislature to satisfy nondelegation principles could the court find
enough guidance to support the agency’s interpretation under
Chevron. In this sense, the Eighth Circuit’s opinion is similar to the
Supreme Court’s in Sweet Home, and is the direct opposite of those of
the Supreme Court in MCI and Brown & Williamson. Finally, in 2009,
the Fifth Circuit managed to avoid the interpretive question entirely,
holding that the statute clearly required the agency’s regulation and
that there was no choice for the agency to make at all.177
Examining these holdings under the model developed in Part
II.A of this Note, it becomes clear that the core difference between
the decisions is, on one hand, whether the court found the agency’s
interpretation to fall within both the range of definitionally reasonable
meanings and the range of meanings that would not threaten
Congress’s policymaking role, or, on the other hand, whether the
court instead found the agency’s interpretation to usurp the legislative
role. The Ninth Circuit, ruling against the FDA, viewed the interpretation as falling in the latter category, while the Eighth Circuit, ruling in
favor of the agency, placed it in the former.
However the Court eventually resolves this question, if at all,178
its answer will likely rest on an assessment of the permissible scope of
agency power.179 Just like the lower courts, and just like its own past
practice in MCI and Brown & Williamson, the Court’s decision will
depend on whether it sees the FDA’s interpretation as entailing a
major policy choice that ought to be left to Congress. Because the
Court is averse to vocal nondelegation enforcement and justifiably
prefers to pursue those ends discreetly, a party challenging the FDA
rule would do well to follow the example of the successful litigants in
MCI and Brown & Williamson and show the Court the way to a
177 See United States v. Palazzo, 558 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 2009) (characterizing issue
before it as one of statutory interpretation), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 196 (2009). The district
court in Palazzo, in spite of the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Garfinkel, had followed the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Smith, just as the district court had in Garfinkel and for the same
nondelegation reason. United States v. Palazzo, No. 05-0266, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78986,
at *21–22 (E.D. La. Oct. 24, 2007) (noting, in nondelegation parlance, that “nothing in [the
statute] provides sufficient guidelines”), rev’d, 558 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 196 (2009).
178 The Court denied certiorari from the Fifth Circuit in 2009. Palazzo v. United States,
130 S. Ct. 196 (2009). However, if the question persists or if the split deepens, the Court
certainly may grant certiorari in another case.
179 Because of the nature of the Ninth and Eighth Circuits’ split, if the Court does hear
this particular issue, it will have the opportunity to address what it explicitly left open in
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166 (1991): whether there is a higher-than-usual bar
for congressional specificity, and therefore a narrower scope of agency policy choice, in the
criminal context.
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favorable decision by subtly framing the issue along nondelegation
lines. In the process, the litigant could nudge the Court’s view of the
FDA’s interpretation into the zone of interpretations that are textually reasonable yet entail the exercise of too much policymaking discretion. Indeed, a potential litigant might draw directly on MCI and
Brown & Williamson, as framed in this Note, to support such a
nondelegation-based limit on the scope of Chevron deference.
CONCLUSION
Two cases, even as significant as MCI and Brown & Williamson,
certainly do not bear out a pattern of systematic nondelegation
enforcement under the guise of Chevron. It is true that, in most cases
and when deference is actually extended, Chevron represents a rule
that permits far more delegation of legislative authority than the
strictest conception of the nondelegation doctrine could ever bear.
MCI and Brown & Williamson do not suggest that Chevron is anything but a powerful tool of deference. They do illustrate, however,
that courts have been wary of what Chevron should require and that
courts will not defer to agency interpretations, even those that are textually sound, if accepting them would sanction the agency’s accretion
of policymaking power better left to Congress. Moreover, they show
that litigants can effectively capitalize on the lasting relevance of
nondelegation principles.
While there are certainly reasons for this limitation to operate
explicitly, perhaps as an acknowledged exception to Chevron’s application, there are strong reasons why the Court should not and need
not do so. However this process debate is resolved, though, the doctrinal conclusion remains that, when a court’s decision seems to be
little more than the incantation of the Chevron test followed by a
rejection of the deference that a rigorous application of the test would
demand, the principle of nondelegation may be operating below the
surface. This realization should encourage litigants to continue to
exploit the Court’s hesitation about Chevron and its sensitivity to
nondelegation principles, and should caution scholars not to dismiss
the validity of constitutional norms regarding the proper allocation of
legislative power.

